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QUALITATIVE DIVERSITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION’S NEW REFRAME
Eang L. Ngov*
How is diversity measured? When is diversity sufficient? The
Supreme Court has pressed these hard questions in affirmative action
cases. With respect to college admissions, although a university campus
might have a diverse student body, universities are beginning to justify
the continuation of race-based affirmative action programs on the need
for qualitative diversity, i.e., intraracial diversity—diversity within
diversity.
In the Court’s most recent affirmative action case, Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin, the university advanced two novel
diversity arguments, never before employed in affirmative action cases,
to justify its race-based admissions policy: there is a lack of diversity
within small courses of 5–24 students, and there is a lack of diversity
among the admitted minority students. The minorities admitted through
the state’s Top Ten Percent program, a neutral class rank program,
typically consisted of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and
who were the first in their family to attend college. The university argued
that its race-based holistic admissions program was necessary to admit
students who could bring viewpoints and experiences different from the
students admitted through the Top Ten Percent Program. Others
construed this argument as the university, in essence, wanting more
privileged minorities with higher credentials.
This article explores the difficulties raised by the qualitative
diversity argument and anticipates the challenges it might wreak upon
the Civil Rights movement. This article cautions that a reliance on
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qualitative diversity to justify affirmative action undermines one of the
bases upon which the Civil Rights movement was founded—to overcome
racial stereotypes. An affirmative action program based on qualitative
diversity also risks jeopardizing the legitimacy of affirmative action
altogether when questions of deservedness within a race are raised and
risks jeopardizing the united front needed to advance civil rights if
people within a race are pitted against each other.
INTRODUCTION
The implementation of race-based admissions has been hotly contested, as
admission into universities is seen as a zero-sum game in the pursuit of a coveted
seat among the limited number available within an entering class. A backlash
against using affirmative action for university admissions burgeoned in some
states.1
In California, Proposition 209 prohibited the use of race for admissions into
its public universities.2 The first year after Prop. 209, Asian American student
enrollment rose substantially but African American enrollment plummeted at the
University of California at Berkeley.3 Despite overall minority enrollment actually
increasing, critics of Prop. 209 decried the lack of diversity at UC Berkeley.4 The
argument centered on the lack of underrepresented minorities.5
In Texas, the state implemented a race-neutral program to admit students
ranked in the top 10% of their high school class into the university of their choice.6
This program yielded one of the most diverse entering classes that the University
of Texas-Austin (hereinafter, “UT Austin”), Texas’s flagship school, has ever

1

See Eang L. Ngov, Following Fisher: Narrowly Tailoring Affirmative Action, 64
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 10–12 (2014) (discussing how voter referenda and executive orders
against affirmative action have prompted states to apply race-neutral measures in public
employment and education).
2
A Brief History of Affirmative Action, OFF. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & DIVERSITY,
http://www.oeod.uci.edu/aa.html [https://perma.cc/F29Q-C7VZ] (last visited Apr. 30,
2017).
3
Tung Yin, Is “Diversity” Diverse Enough?, ASIAN AM. L.J. 89, 99 (2014);
Challenging Race Sensitive Admission Policies, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/race/summary.html [https://perma.cc/6BEJ-RVM6] (last
visited Apr. 30, 2017).
4
Yin, supra note 3, at 99.
5
Id.
6
CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES’ EXPERIENCES 16–23 (The
Civil Rights Project at Harvard University ed.) (2003), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.
edu/research/college-access/admissions/percent-plans-in-college-admissions-a-comparative
-analysis-of-three-states2019-experiences/horn-percent-plans-2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WJC6-V8P6].
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experienced.7 At the same time, UT Austin used a race-based approach to admit
students for the remaining seats.8 The university argued that the quality of diversity
achieved through the race-neutral class rank program was deficient in that the
admitted minority students were likely to be the first among their family to attend
college and come from a lower socioeconomic class.9 The university was seeking
to admit minority students, from more privileged backgrounds, who did not
succeed in getting admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan.10
This Article provides the first critique of the qualitative diversity argument.
Qualitative diversity has attracted the attention of a few scholars who have written
thoughtful works on intraracial diversity, but those works have been in defense of
this new approach to diversity.11 Because the Court’s opinion in Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II) was devoid of any direct discussions of
intraracial diversity when it upheld the university’s race-based policy, after the
case’s second appearance before the Court,12 the need for a critical perspective is
all the more present. This Article hopes to fill the void in critical scholarship about
qualitative diversity and presents arguments that advocate for the need to anticipate
fortifying affirmative action, should it come under siege again.
In Part I, this Article sets forth how qualitative diversity serves as affirmative
action’s new “reframe.” Because race-neutral programs have achieved diversity to
comparable levels of prior race-based measures, they threaten the support for
affirmative action. In response, UT Austin reframed the diversity rationale, which

7

Darren Meritz, Top 10% Plan Has Improved Diversity at Top Texas Colleges, EL
PASO TIMES (Jan. 23, 2004), http://theop.princeton.edu/publicity/theop/ElPasoTimes0123
04.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4Y3-LYLT].
8
HORN & FLORES, supra note 6, at 17.
9
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133
S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345), http://supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
11-345.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB85-YNYF].
10
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2216 (2016) (Alito,
J., dissenting); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9.
11
See generally Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130,
1130 (2013) (leaving open the normative question of whether qualitative diversity should
be deployed, yet supporting the qualitative diversity rationale by outlining how intraracial
delineations might advance the benefits of diversity); Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within
Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 463, 463 (2012) (advancing several justifications for promoting race-conscious
policies that increase minority representation overall as well as within minority groups);
Elise Boddie, Commentary on Fisher: The Importance of Diversity Within Diversity,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/comment
ary-on-fisher-the-importance-of-diversity-within-diversity [https://perma.cc/B2WE-LX7S]
(discussing the importance of intraracial diversity).
12
See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2217 (Alito, J., dissenting) (outlining UT Austin’s
prior reliance on the qualitative diversity argument and pointing out that Court failed to
address “the important issues in the case”).
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focused on diversity between racial groups, to a more granular level.13 In adopting
the qualitative diversity reframe, UT Austin sought to continue racial preferences
by arguing for diversity within each racial group.14
In Part II, this Article discusses how this “qualitative diversity” argument
undermines the strides made in the affirmative action movement by stretching the
diversity rationale too thinly. One criticism that opponents will lodge at the
insistence to achieve qualitative diversity is that it pits “brother against brother.”
The delineation between minority groups, i.e. interracial diversity, alienates
particular minority racial groups that are considered overrepresented and,
therefore, not valued in the pursuit of diversity. Programs focused on
underrepresented minorities have polarized racial groups. The qualitative diversity
argument poses a greater risk to affirmative action because it seeks intraracial
diversity, diversity within a racial group. For example, some scholars have argued
that affirmative action should particularly benefit legacy Blacks who are
descendants of slaves over Blacks who are recent immigrants.15 Arguments over
deservedness between minority groups and within racial groups will only give
affirmative action critics more fodder.
Part III highlights how the qualitative diversity approach relies on
stereotypes, and in doing so, undermines its rationale. Part IV discusses how the
qualitative diversity argument is also prone to question by affirmative action critics
because it has no logical ending point. To what level do universities plan to
measure diversity? How refined a gradation will be applied?
Finally, this Article argues in Part V that the qualitative diversity argument
opens the door for the Court to overrule Grutter v. Bollinger and Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke and retreat from its prior recognition of diversity
as a compelling interest.16 Thus, affirmative action proponents must carefully plan
their next move to secure diversity without losing the entire war.
I. DIVERSITY REFRAMED
It has been sixty years since Brown v. Board of Education,17 yet the debate
over affirmative action is as vigorous as ever. Previously, stakeholders battled over
what is a sufficiently compelling purpose to allow race, even if used benignly, to

13

Id. at 2205–06 (pointing out UT Austin’s attempt to disclaim its prior emphasis on
the need to achieve intraracial diversity).
14
Id.
15
See generally Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth:
Affirmative Action and the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at
Selective Higher Educational Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1229–32 (2008)
(questioning “the process that lumps all blacks into a single-category approach”).
16
See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I would
overrule Grutter.”).
17
374 U.S. 483 (1954).
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be considered in public employment and school admissions decisions.18 The
Supreme Court permitted race as a consideration only in two narrow
circumstances: remedial discrimination19 and diversity.20 It is not enough to show
past societal discrimination because the Court has insisted that an effort to remedy
past societal discrimination is not compelling, but rather, racial classifications may
be used only if the entity seeking to use such classifications proves to the Court
that the entity itself has engaged in past discrimination.21
In Grutter v. Bollinger,22 the Court accepted diversity as a compelling interest
because of the benefits to a student’s education and development that would flow
from having a diverse class.23 The Court espoused the many benefits of diversity:
to facilitate a “robust exchange of ideas,”24 increase inclusion of underrepresented
minorities,25 contribute to the character of an institution,26 facilitate cross racial
understanding,27 overcome racial stereotypes,28 train students for employment,29
prepare students for leadership roles,30 and reduce racial isolation.31 Thus, diversity
was framed as a benefit to the individual, class, and institution of higher education.
Responding to challenges that its raced-based admissions program is no
longer necessary because its race-neutral Top Ten Percent program produced a
diverse entering class, the University of Texas reframed the diversity rationale in
Fisher. The plaintiff pointed out the effectiveness of the Top Ten Percent Plan by
comparing racial compositions in the student body population before the state’s
prior ban on racial preferences and after the ban.32 The percentage of minorities
enrolled through the Top Ten Percent Plan alone exceeded the percentage of
minorities enrolled under a race-based program before the ban.33 Consequently, the
18

For in-depth analysis of compelling interests for racial classifications, see Eang L.
Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision and the Equal
Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2010).
19
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
20
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978).
21
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
22
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
23
See id. at 325.
24
Id. at 329.
25
See id. at 316.
26
See id.
27
See id. at 330.
28
See id.
29
Id. at 303.
30
See id. at 332.
31
See id. at 318–21.
32
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592–93
(W.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013), and aff’d, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014).
33
See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 594–95, 603 (citing to the University Proposal,
which conceded that the race neutral Top Ten Percent program yielded more minority
students than pre-Hopwood race-based program). In the last year under the combined race-
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plaintiff argued that such evidence obviates the need for UT Austin to continue its
race-based holistic admissions program.34
Additionally, the university employed a macro level and micro level strategy
to reframe the diversity rationale. At the macro level, UT Austin argued that a
raced-based admissions program was necessary to achieve a critical mass of
qualitatively diverse students within its student body.35 Diversity was reframed to
encompass intraracial diversity.36 At the micro level, UT Austin argued that it had
not achieved critical mass in its small classes.37
To the extent that the qualitative diversity approach relies on the same
rationales and means of implementation as the broader diversity rationale, the
qualitative diversity approach is vulnerable to the same criticisms articulated
against the diversity rationale. To the extent that qualitative diversity seeks to
refine the diversity inquiry, it invites new criticisms not previously relevant to the
broader diversity pursuit.
II. DESERVEDNESS
Evaluating qualitative diversity invites questions of deservedness and how
deservedness will be determined. The Court has entertained two measures of
deservedness; each measure has implications for interracial groups as well as
intraracial groups.
A. What Does Diversity Mean?—Squeezing out Asian Americans
A quest to find the meaning of diversity must begin with the following
pronouncement by the Grutter Court, upholding the University of Michigan’s racebased admissions policy:
The policy does, however, reaffirm the Law School’s longstanding
commitment to “one particular type of diversity,” that is, “racial and
ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African–
Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this
neutral holistic and Top Ten Percent programs, “[t]he 2004 entering class thus had a higher
percentage of African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Hispanics than the class that
entered in 1996, when UT had last employed racial preferences.” Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2218 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).
34
See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
35
See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2219 (Alito, J., dissenting); Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 9, at 43.
36
See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (Alito, J., dissenting).
37
See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 603 (citing to the University’s Proposal, which
claimed “race-neutral efforts have failed to improve racial diversity within the class
room”); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2226 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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commitment might not be represented in our student body in meaningful
numbers.” By enrolling a “critical mass of [underrepresented] minority
students,” the Law School seeks to “ensur[e] their ability to make unique
contributions to the character of the Law School.”38
Through these two statements, Justice O’Connor appeared to convey two
purposes for diversity: 1) a social justice concern, manifested through her reference
to historical discrimination in the first statement; and 2) a focus on contributions to
a school as expressed in the second statement. Within the framework of these two
statements, this Part explores who may be considered for diversity. Because
African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans have been incorporated into
these goals through Justice O’Connor’s express reference to these racial groups,
the question remains: What of the Asian Americans?
In one breath, it appeared that Asian Americans would be part of the diversity
discussion, and yet in another, Asian Americans were excluded. Initially, the first
statement seemed to suggest that Asian Americans were intended to be included as
the Court referred to groups that have been historically discriminated. To be clear,
under a compensatory rationale for affirmative action, there is an argument that
African Americans should be the sole beneficiaries of affirmative action.39 But
Justice O’Connor’s inclusion of other groups, such as Hispanics, leads one to

38

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
39
See Frank Wu, Neither Black or White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action,
15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 263 (1995). Dean Wu recognizes that “[t]he compensatory
rationale makes it difficult to justify affirmative action, as it is presently practiced, for any
racial group other than African Americans.” Id. Professor Pat Chew poses several questions
relevant to deciding how an affirmative action program premised on remedial past
discrimination should be implemented:
Are some types of past discrimination more extreme and hence more
worthy of remedy than others? For instance, should one compare the slavery of
African Americans to the deprivation of the property and lives of the Native
American tribes to the riots, lynching, and internment of Asian Americans? And
if so, how?
At what point should preferential treatment on the basis of past
discrimination cease? Have Asian Americans and Jewish Americans, but not
other minority groups reached that point?
Should everyone in a particular minority group be included or should an
individual have to show a more direct link to past discrimination? For instance,
should an individual have to trace his or her relationship to a Japanese American
World War II internee or to a Chinese American “coolie” who was lynched?
Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent” Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 90 (1994).
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believe that she had intended the diversity rationale to apply to other historically
disadvantaged groups, in addition to African Americans.
That Asian Americans faced historical discrimination is not contestable.40 At
the federal level, Asian Americans were discriminated against in mass numbers. In
the mid-1800s, over 6,000 Chinese laborers were imported as part of a slave trade,
and 4,000 of them perished through their consignment to work in the Peruvian
guano pits.41 Not long after their arrival, the oppression and discrimination
continued through the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which imposed a ten-year
restriction on Chinese immigration into the U.S and was the “first time [that]
Federal law proscribed entry of an ethnic working group on the premise that it
endangered the good order of certain localities.”42 Subsequent laws restricted
Chinese immigrants from seeking naturalization.43 During World War II, after his
declaration that the Pearl Harbor bombing of the U.S. would be a date that would
“live in infamy,” President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed his own infamous
Executive Order 9066, forcibly removing 117,000 Japanese Americans from their
homes and incarcerating them in mass concentration44 camps.45 Two-thirds of
these Japanese Americans were U.S. citizens born on U.S. soil.46
40

For an extensive discussion of discrimination against Asian Americans, see Chew,
supra note 39; Wu, supra note 39.
41
Chew, supra note 39, at 9–10 n.15.
42
Chinese
Exclusion
Act,
H.R.
5-804,
47th
Cong.
(1882),
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=47
[https://perma.cc/RDA38FL3] (last visited May 1, 2017); see also Chew, supra note 39, at 13–15; Wu, supra note
39, at 232–33 (relating the social and racial tension that led to the Chinese Exclusion Act).
43
Chinese
Exclusion
Act,
H.R.
5-804,
47th
Cong.
(1882),
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=47
[https://perma.cc/RDA38FL3] (last visited May 1, 2017).
44
Although the forced relocation of Japanese Americans has been commonly referred
to as an internment, the Fred T. Korematsu Institute points out that the term “internment” is
inappropriate: “Internment literally refers to the confinement or impounding of enemy
aliens during a war (Merriam-Webster, 2011). Although thousands of people of Japanese
ancestry were incarcerated during World War II, they were not ‘enemy aliens.’ Moreover,
they were not simply ‘confined’ into camps.” Terminology, FRED T. KOREMATSU INST.,
http://www.korematsuinstitute.org/terminology-1 [https://perma.cc/9ZCR-R49M] (last
visited Mar. 24, 2017).
45
Teaching with Documents: Documents and Photographs Related to Japanese
Relocation During World War II, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/education/
lessons/japanese-relocation/ [https://perma.cc/UAK3-NHY6] (last visited Mar. 24, 2017)
[hereinafter National Archives, Teaching with Documents]; see also Harvey Gee, Review
Essay: Asian Americans, Critical Race Theory, and the End of the Model Minority Myth,
19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 149, 167–70 (2009); Chew, supra note 39, at 10–11
n.17 (detailing the plight of Japanese Americans); Wu, supra note 39, at 234–36
(discussing the social and political climate that led to the Japanese Americans’
incarceration).
46
National Archives, Teaching with Documents, supra note 45.
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At the local level, Asian Americans faced a double-edged sword of being
presumed to have benefited from affirmative action, while in reality they suffered
from discriminatory admissions policies.47 For example, San Francisco’s elite
magnet school, Lowell High School, raised the admissions standards for Chinese
American applicants to maintain a cap imposed by a consent decree.48 Lowell
accepted 30% more White students than Chinese American students, despite that
half of the admitted Whites were outperformed by all of the Chinese American
students on entrance exams.49 Additionally, the University of California at
Berkeley School of Law, otherwise known as Boalt Hall, discriminated against
Asian Americans when it implemented in 1975 a policy that denied Japanese
Americans special admissions and capped admissions of Chinese, Korean, and
Filipino applicants to less than 3% of all special admits.50 Similar policies at
Brown, Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, UCLA, and UC Berkeley were challenged
because fewer Asian Americans were admitted than Whites, despite the “dramatic”
increase of Asian American applicants.51
When Justice Douglas considered whether admissions policies could allot
seats for admissions based on past harm, he noted that “there is no Western State
47

Wu, supra note 39, at 226 (“Indeed, Asian Americans frequently are imagined as
the beneficiaries of special consideration, although they almost always are excluded from
race-based college admissions and employment programs.”); accord Chew, supra note 39,
at 75.
48
Nancy Chung Allred, Asian Americans and Affirmative Action: From Yellow Peril
to Model Minority and Back Again, 14 ASIAN AM. L.J. 57, 60 (2007); Caitlin M. Liu,
Recent Development, Beyond Black and White: Chinese Americans Challenge San
Francisco’s Desegregation Plan, 5 ASIAN L.J. 341, 343 (1998).
49
Allred, supra note 48, at 60; Liu, supra note 48, at 343.
50
Sharon S. Lee, The De-Minoritization of Asian Americans: A Historical
Examination of the Representations of Asian Americans in Affirmative Action Admissions
Policies at the University of California, 15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 129, 137 (2008).
51
Id. at 144; Chew, supra note 39, at 63; Wu, supra note 39, at 268–69. Currently,
Harvard faces a lawsuit for its allegedly discriminatory admissions policy that caps Asian
American admissions. Kirk Carapezza, Is Harvard Showing Bias Against AsianAmericans?, NPR (May 20, 2015, 4:37 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2015/05/20/
408240998/is-harvard-showing-bias-against-asian-americans
[https://perma.cc/ST35TZDQ]. For similar stories, see Melissa Chen, Why the Asian-American Lawsuit Against
Harvard Is Doomed to Fail, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 15, 2015, 3:08 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-chen/why-the-asianamerican-law_b_7799098.html
[https://perma.cc/M3A9-FB5X]; Maxim Lott, Rejected Asian Students Sue Harvard over
Admissions that Favor Other Minorities, FOXNEWS (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/11/18/rejected-asian-students-sue-harvard-overadmissions-that-favor-other-minorities.html
[https://perma.cc/G7DD-6Q3F];
Charles
Wheelan, A Case for Preferential Treatment?: Accusations that Harvard Is Biased Against
Asian-American Applicants Highlight Admissions Decision, Trade-Offs, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPS. (June 9, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/charleswheelan/2015/06/09/claims-of-harvard-bias-against-asian-americans-show-admissionstrade-offs [https://perma.cc/LLF7-D62J].
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which can claim that it has always treated Japanese and Chinese in a fair and
evenhanded manner.”52 But remarkably, Asian Americans were noticeably absent
from the list of racial groups specified in the Justice O’Connor’s first statement as
having suffered historical discrimination.
The second statement appeared to have intended to include Asian Americans,
as it referred to students who can make “unique contributions to the character” of a
school.53 Yet, this second statement also left Asians out of consideration for
contributions to diversity benefits when Justice O’Connor inserted the word
“underrepresented” before the word “minority.”54 The inclusion of Asian
Americans in the diversity discussion hinges on the modifier “underrepresented,”
which prompts the question: What does underrepresented mean? The MerriamWebster dictionary defines underrepresented as “inadequately represented”55 and
overrepresented to mean “represented excessively; especially: having
representatives in a proportion higher than the average.”56
In 2008, the number of Hispanics enrolled at UT Austin outnumbered the
number of Asians, 1,339 Hispanics compared to 1,248 Asians.57 Thus, there was a
greater of percentage of Hispanics than Asians in UT Austin’s entering class. Yet,
the Fifth Circuit construed Hispanics as underrepresented and Asian Americans as
overrepresented at UT Austin:
The mere fact that the gross number of Hispanic students attending UT
exceeds the gross number of Asian–American students attending UT
does not mean Hispanics are not an “underrepresented” minority group.
Hispanic students remain underrepresented at UT when their student
population as a percentage of the entire UT population is compared to
Texas’ Hispanic and Latino population. According to the latest statistics
from the United States Census Bureau, Texas’ population is 36 percent
Hispanic or Latino. In contrast, in 2008 only 20 percent of admitted
and/or enrolled UT students were Hispanic. Thus, compared to their
percentage of Texas’ population as a whole, Hispanics remain
underrepresented. Asian–Americans, on the other hand, are largely
overrepresented compared to their percentage of Texas’ population.58
52

Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003).
54
See id.
55
Underrepresented, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/underrepresented [https://perma.cc/8FFM-966R] (last visited May 8, 2017).
56
Overrepresented, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/overrepresented [https://perma.cc/U7ZG-HFZJ] (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
57
Office of Info. Mgmt. & Analysis, Common Data Set 2008-2009, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
https://sps.austin.utexas.edu/sites/ut/IRRIS/CDS/IMA_PUB_CDS_2008_AY.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B77A-QKYQ].
58
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606 (W.D. Tex. 2009)
(citations omitted).
53
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The Fifth Circuit’s formulation of overrepresentation and underrepresentation
sought to mirror the state’s racial population, which can be challenged as
amounting to racial balancing as proscribed by the Supreme Court.59
Incidentally, it is ironic that although UT Austin relied on the racial isolation
as a justification for qualitative diversity, it neglected to consider the isolation
faced by Asian Americans. As Justice Alito keenly noted,
If, on the other hand, state demographics are not driving UT’s interest in
avoiding racial isolation, then its treatment of Asian-American students
is hard to understand. As the District Court noted, “the gross number of
Hispanic students attending UT exceeds the gross number of AsianAmerican students.” In 2008, for example, UT enrolled 1,338 Hispanic
freshmen and 1,249 Asian-American freshmen. UT never explains why
the Hispanic students—but not the Asian-American students—are
isolated and lonely enough to receive an admissions boost,
notwithstanding the fact that there are more Hispanics than AsianAmericans in the student population. The anecdotal statements from UT
officials certainly do not indicate that Hispanics are somehow lonelier
than Asian-Americans.60
Thus, the pursuit of diversity over the concern of students feeling isolated has once
again squeezed out Asian Americans.
Another way that Asians have been left out of the diversity pursuit is through
mirroring admissions of racial groups to the applicant pool. Such proportioning
causes Asian Americans to be construed as an overrepresented group and is
another form of balancing that disadvantages Asian Americans. Professor Tung
Yin points out that many campuses have embraced a narrow conception of
diversity that focuses on correlating admissions for minority groups with applicant
pools, allowing for admissions of minority groups in equal proportion to each
other, except for Whites: Schools universally allot 5%–12% of its admissions for
each minority group and 65%–70% for Whites.61
59

See infra Part V.A.3.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2236 (2016) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
61
Yin, supra note 3, at 96. Professor Yin offers a novel formulation for diversity—
that the percentage of admissions relegated to be shared among Asians, Blacks, Latinos,
and Other be redistributed in order that one minority racial group may have a greater
percentage at some schools. Thus, he proposes that the overall White to non-White
proportion at all law schools can be maintained, but minority groups need not be evenly
divided at each school. Id. at 91–92. For example, he suggests that instead of each school
admitting one to four Native Americans, some schools would have zero while others would
have amassed the bulk of Native American students. Id. at 105–06. The benefit of this
proposal, he suggests, would reduce the potential for the one to four Native Americans to
60
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When this balance is disturbed, cries of lack of diversity can be heard. For
example, Frontline reported that when California’s Prop. 209 ban on race-based
preferences for admissions became effective in its undergraduate campuses, the
University of California at Berkeley “accepted its least diverse freshman class in
17 years, admitting 56 percent fewer blacks and 49 percent fewer Latinos than in
1997,”62 despite the fact that Asians outnumbered Whites.63 In another instance,
when Black students amounted to only 0.9% of the student body at the California
Institute of Technology (“Caltech”), the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education
assailed Caltech as “[t]he Whitest of the Nation’s 25 Highest-Ranked
Universities.”64 In 2008 Caltech’s entering class consisted of less than 1% Black
and 6% Hispanic students.65 In that same year, Caltech’s Asian student population
(at 40%) exceeded Whites (at 39%). However, Harvard, rather than Caltech, was
lauded for admitting the “most diverse” entering class in its history when it
admitted an entering class of 60% Whites.66
Many colleges and universities have adopted a conception of diversity that
mirrors proportions of the applicant pool.67 Law schools, in particular, follow this
narrow conception of diversity. The application pool to ABA accredited law
schools has hovered around 60%–65% White, and for Black, Asian Americans,
and Latinos, each group ranged from 5% to 12%.68 Law school admissions tend to
reflect the ABA applicant pool distribution: “around 60–70 percent white students,
with the remainder divided fairly evenly among Asian American, African
American, and Latino/Hispanic American students, with a handful of Native
American students.”69

feel racially isolated. Id. Professor Yin concludes that each school does not need “the same
or similar kind of diversity. Rather, what is important is that across all comparable
institutions (and in particular, elite institutions) there exists sufficient diversity.” Id. at 127.
62
Id. at 99; Challenging Race Sensitive Admission Policies, supra note 3.
63
See Yin, supra note 3, at 99 n.30 (citing other characterizations of decreased
diversity after Prop. 209).
64
See id. at 102 (alteration in original).
65
See id. (citing Russell K. Nieli, Why Caltech is in a Class by Itself, MINDING THE
CAMPUS (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.mindingthecampus.org/2010/12/why_caltech_is_in_a
_class_by_i/ [https://perma.cc/TM25-UJ2E]).
66
See id. (quoting College Class of 2010 is the Most Diverse in Harvard History,
HARV. UNIV. GAZETTE (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/04.06/
03-admissions.html [https://perma.cc/Q7MJ-MCB3]).
67
See id. at 91, 96–97 (noting that most law schools have a minority student
population between 17.6 and 30.8 percent).
68
See id., at 96; see also ACCESS GROUP, 2015 LEGAL EDUCATION DATA DECK: KEY
TRENDS
ON
ACCESS,
AFFORDABILITY,
AND
VALUE
5
(2015),
https://www.accessgroup.org/system/tdf/2015_legal_education_data_deck.pdf?file=1&type
=node&id=406. [https://perma.cc/MGG3-HGVZ].
69
See Yin, supra note 3, at 89.
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Some idealized that a diverse school would consist of 20% White, Black,
Asian, Hispanic, and Other.70 Some lower courts, however, have rejected such
propositions: “[N]othing in Grutter requires a university to give equal preference
to every minority group.”71 But if courts were to permit or require this idealized
standard, Berkeley, Caltech, and Harvard could hardly be described as diverse
under this standard. Yet, neither would Howard University. The student racial
composition of Howard is “0.8% American Indian/Alaskan Native, 1.4% Asian,
95.3% Black/African-American, 0.5% Hispanic/Latino, 0.0% Multi-race (not
Hispanic/Latino), 0.2% Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander, 1.9% White, [and] 0.0%
Unknown.”72 Putting aside Howard’s historical origins as a Historically Black
College and University (HBCU), no one would think to criticize Howard for its
abysmal admission of Native American, Asian, and Hispanic students as lacking in
diversity. To be clear, the Author is not suggesting that there is anything wrong
with Howard’s admissions73 but only raises its admissions statistics as a foil to
prompt conversations about what diversity means.74
B. Intraracial Diversity
Equally elusive is the question of what qualitative diversity means. This
section examines how qualitative diversity will be determined with respect to class,
the distinction between immigrant Blacks and legacy Blacks, and intraracial Asian
American groups, which naturally prompts inquiries into the deservedness of each
of these groups.
1. The Privileged
The dialogue initiated by the Justices during oral arguments in the Fisher case
captured the Justices’ concern over conceptualization and implementation of
qualitative diversity:

70

See Deirdre M. Bowen, American Skin: Dispensing with Colorblindness and
Critical Mass in Affirmative Action, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 384 (2011); see also Yin,
supra note 3, at 108.
71
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
72
Howard University Overview, C. DATA, http://www.collegedata.com/cs/data/
college/college_pg01_tmpl.jhtml?schoolId=1024 [https://perma.cc/42ZU-22KN] (last
visited Mar. 7, 2017).
73
In fact, Blacks attending Howard and other HCBUs are better prepared for graduate
schools than those who attend colleges and universities with predominately White student
populations. See Yin, supra note 3, at 110.
74
If one were to employ a White vs. non-White conception of diversity, then in a
comparison of the four schools, Howard would rank at the top, and Caltech and Berkeley
would be second, with Harvard trailing behind.
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Mr. Garre: . . . . And I don’t think it’s been seriously disputed in this—
this case to this point that, although the percentage plan certainly helps
with minority admissions, by and large, the—the minorities who are
admitted tend to come from segregated, racially-identifiable schools.
Justice Alito: Well, I thought that the whole purpose of affirmative action
was to help students who come from underprivileged backgrounds, but
you make a very different argument that I don’t think I’ve ever seen
before. The top 10 percent plan admits lots of African Americans—lots
of Hispanics and a fair number of African Americans. But you say, well,
it’s—it’s faulty because it doesn’t admit enough African Americans and
Hispanics who come from privileged backgrounds. And you specifically
have the example of the child of successful professionals in Dallas. Now,
that’s your—that’s your argument? If you . . . have an applicant whose
parents are—let’s say they’re—one of them is a partner in your law firm
in Texas, another one is . . . another corporate lawyer. They have income
that puts them in the top 1 percent of earners in the country, and they
have—parents both have graduate degrees. They deserve a leg-up
against, let’s say, an Asian or a white applicant whose parents are
absolutely average in terms of education and income?
Mr. Garre: No, Your Honor. . . .
Justice Alito: Well, how can the answer to that question be no, because
being an African American or being a Hispanic is a plus factor.
Mr. Garre: Because, Your Honor, our point is, is that we want minorities
from different backgrounds. We go out of our way to recruit minorities
from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Justice Kennedy: So what you’re saying is that what counts is race above
all?
....
Justice Kennedy: You want underprivileged of a certain race and
privileged of a certain race. So that’s race.75
As Justice Alito’s question highlights, the qualitative diversity argument risks
undermining affirmative action through the attention that the approach gives to

75

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 43–45.
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privileged minorities.76 UT Austin’s justification that its raced-based policy is an
effort to bring diverse viewpoints beyond those attained through the Top Ten
Percent program naturally links UT Austin’s qualitative diversity approach to
privileged minorities.77 Because studies show that affirmative action tends to
benefit affluent minorities, UT Austin’s desire to use its race-based admissions
program to reach other minorities outside of the Top Ten Percent program will
result in increased admissions for the privileged.78
Assuming arguendo that UT Austin was genuinely interested in admitting
privileged minorities to overcome racial stereotypes and promote cross racial
understanding, rather than to maintain its prestigious ranking through the
admissions of privileged minorities with higher credentials,79 the argument for
qualitative diversity would actually militate against allowing racial preferences for
the university’s holistic review. Because of the broad perception that affirmative
action benefits privileged minorities—who are first-generation and secondgeneration Blacks—over underprivileged minorities,80 racial stereotypes would
76

Professor Carbado suggests that the appropriate response would be to remind
Justice Alito that helping underprivileged students was not constitutionally sanctioned for
affirmative action. He offers that the University should have explained that diversity has
been the constitutionally accepted rationale for affirmative action and that intraracial
diversity would advance that rationale. Carbado, supra note 11, at 1180. While it is true
that diversity, rather than remedying societal discrimination, garnered constitutional
traction, some advocates conflate the remedial rationale with the diversity rationale. The
Reverend Jesse Jackson, for example, asserted that “Universities have to give weight to the
African-American experience because that is for whom affirmative action was aimed in the
first place. That intent must be honored.” Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of
Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1150–51 (2007).
77
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2241–42 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
78
See Ngov, supra note 1, at 23–25 (discussing the impact of socioeconomic status
on college admissions); see also University Race-Sensitive Admissions Programs Are Not
Helping Black Students Who Most Need Assistance, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC.,
http://www.jbhe.com/news_views/56_race_sensitive_not_helping.html [https://perma.cc/
L8WM-KNBJ] (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (examining the socioeconomic background of
black students at selective colleges).
79
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015). The data show that students admitted through the race-based
holistic review possess higher credentials than those admitted through the Top Ten Percent
program. Judge Higginbotham observed, “With each entering class, there was a gap
between the lower standardized test scores of students admitted under the Top Ten Percent
Plan and the higher scores of those admitted under holistic review . . . A gap persisted not
only among students overall and white students, but also among racial and ethnic minority
students.” Id.
80
Professor Lani Guinier observes that
admissions decisions recreate a “geography of unequal opportunity” in which
suburban students succeed and rural and urban students are left behind.
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more likely be dismantled by admitting more impoverished minority students, like
those admitted through the Top Ten Percent program. Similarly, because firstgeneration and second-generation Blacks comprise over 40% of black students at
Ivy League universities,81 a critic is likely to point out that if qualitative diversity is
the goal of race-based policies, then the diversity attained through the Top Ten
Percent program would be diluted through UT Austin’s race-based program, which
is more likely to admit first-generation and second-generation Blacks. As Professor
Onwuachi-Willig has argued,
the[] overrepresentation [of mixed-race, first-generation, and secondgeneration black students] at elite institutions of learning does not
necessarily advance the factors that are commonly viewed as the primary
benefits of diversity. . . . In other words, overrepresentation of certain
groups of Blacks, such as second-generation West Indian Blacks or
Blacks from the Northeast, decreases the likelihood of differing
viewpoints in the classroom and on campus . . . .82
The purpose of this discussion is not to advance a particular notion of whether
privileged as opposed to impoverished Blacks, or whether first-generation and
second-generation Blacks as opposed to legacy Blacks, better facilitate the benefits
of diversity. But rather, the purpose is to bring to the forefront that UT Austin’s
qualitative diversity argument may undermine the very benefits of diversity it
seeks to realize.
2. Legacy Blacks versus Immigrant Blacks
The question of deservedness has been entwined with distinctions between
legacy Blacks, who are descendant of slaves, and immigrant blacks. “Many argue
. . . Risk-averse admissions officers cherry pick among applicants of color and
fail to recruit in urban or rural public schools.
Many colleges rely on private networks that disproportionately benefit the
children of African and West Indian immigrants who come from majority black
countries and who arrived in the United States after 1965. Affluent, welleducated new immigrants from South America bolster Latino diversity statistics
while the children of migrant farm workers are left behind.
Lani Guinier, Opinion, Our Preference for the Privileged, BOS. GLOBE (July 9, 2004), at
A13, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/guinier/publications/preference.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B2VZ-N5LY]. Accord Carbado, supra note 11, at 1181 (recognizing the
“general criticism of affirmative action—namely, that the policy only benefits classprivileged blacks”).
81
Douglas S. Massey et al., Black Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective
Colleges and Universities in the United States, 113 AM. J. EDUC. 243, 248 tbl.1
(2007);
Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1249–54; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1147.
82
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1184–85.
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that it was students like these [i.e., the descendants of slaves], disadvantaged by the
legacy of Jim Crow laws, segregation and decades of racism, poverty and inferior
schools, who were intended as principal beneficiaries of affirmative action in
university admissions.”83 For example,
[t]he president of Amherst College, Anthony W. Marx, says that
colleges should care about the ethnicity of black students because in
overlooking those with predominantly American roots, colleges are
missing an “opportunity to correct a past injustice” and depriving their
campuses “of voices that are particular to being African-American, with
all the historical disadvantages that that entails.”84
Similarly, Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig argues that immigrant Blacks
have garnered the benefits of affirmative action in greater proportion to legacy
Blacks, and she proposes that although immigrant Blacks should not be excluded,
schools should consider ancestral heritage as part of their racial preference in
making admissions decisions.85 She draws upon differences between legacy Blacks
and immigrant Blacks in education, culture, and economics to support her claim.86
Although Professor Onwuachi-Willig is careful not to explicitly state this,87 the
question lurking in the background is whether black descendants of slavery have a
stronger claim for affirmative action than immigrant Blacks. After building her
case for greater inclusion of legacy Blacks, Professor Onwuachi-Willig takes care
to refute any insinuations that immigrant Blacks should be excluded from
affirmative action considerations. Professors Kevin Brown and Jeannine Bell, on
the other hand, expressly argue that legacy Blacks, or to use their phrase
“Ascendants,” have a greater entitlement to affirmative action: “From the
perspective of the struggle of blacks in the United States to overcome the historical
racism here, however, the descendants of those blacks who suffered from racism in
this country should receive priority. After all, their parents did not choose to come
to the United States.”88 Therefore, if the answer is yes to the question of whether
legacy Blacks have a stronger claim to affirmative action, then critics are likely to
argue that not all Blacks should be given a “plus” for affirmative action

83

Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But Which
Ones?, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/us/top-collegestake-more-blacks-but-which-ones.html [https://perma.cc/5SAX-ZU9W].
84
Id.
85
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 77, at 1144–49, 1157–58.
86
Id. at 1157–58; see Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1265 (distinguishing
differences between immigrant and ascendant Blacks).
87
But see Yin, supra note 3, at 116 (interpreting Onwuachi-Willig’s work as arguing
“that affirmative action programs should specially benefit legacy blacks, who have suffered
the worst effects of discrimination and oppression”).
88
Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1236.

440

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

admissions—even under a qualitative diversity approach that encompasses a
compensatory motive for affirmative action.
Because the qualitative diversity argument relies on intraracial distinctions, it
necessarily implicates questions of deservedness—a question that risks exclusion
of subgroups within a racial group. If racial preferences are given for social justice
concerns, qualitative diversity leads to the question of which group has suffered
more. Consider the example of Professor Onwuachi-Willig’s discussion about the
discriminatory experiences of legacy Blacks and immigrant Blacks. She explains
that immigrant Blacks do not suffer stigma and maltreatment as acutely as legacy
Blacks because they are more likely to be viewed by Whites as “good Blacks” as
opposed to “bad Blacks,”89 which facilitates their inclusion in communities and
schools. But others opine that immigrant Blacks experience as great or even
greater discrimination at the hands of legacy Blacks.90
In fact, studies have shown that one reason why some first- and secondgeneration Blacks may work to form identities separate from legacy
Blacks is the negative social treatment that they have experienced from
legacy Blacks, such as taunting because of accents and family dress.
Immigrant Blacks often experience deeper hurt as a result of such
criticism from legacy Blacks than from Whites. In this sense, first- and
second-generation black Americans suffer a double discrimination that
many African-Americans do not have to endure, both the disadvantage of
blackness in a racist American society and the disadvantage of foreignness in a nationalist society.91
Thus, the purpose of this discussion is not to debate who has been more
aggrieved but to point out that a conception of qualitative diversity that includes
delineations of merit based on past suffering inescapably requires weighing of past
harms. Of course, a response might be to include all those who suffer
discrimination, but when seats at elite colleges are limited, inevitably, line drawing
on the basis of past harms will have to be made. Justice Douglas, when he opposed
affirmative action on the premise for redressing historical harms, was attuned to
the “slippery slope”92 nature of making such valuations in “the . . . attempt to
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Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1177.
Immigrant Blacks “have negative experiences of rejection from Ascendants who
may also see them as different.” Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1271. Similarly, bi-racial
black students feel alienation and perhaps discrimination by monoracial blacks. Id. at 1262.
“Some 40% of the biracial black students described negative experiences with other blacks
compared to only 12% of the monoracial black students.” Id.
91
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1203.
92
Yena Lee, Asian Americans and Affirmative Action: Through the Study of Fisher v.
University of Texas, 5 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 127, 133 (2013); Wu,
supra note 39, at 258.
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assess how grievously each group has suffered from discrimination, and allocate
proportions accordingly.”93
On the other hand, if qualitative diversity focuses on racial diversity, the
qualitative diversity argument leads to the question of who is more Black, Asian,
Hispanic, Native American, etc. For example, Professor Onwuachi-Willig is
concerned about students who do not “live the experiences of racial minorities”
but, nevertheless, claim minority status on college applications by virtue of their
biology, as determined by genetic testing.94 Although one might characterize their
actions as a “fraud” and “misrepresentation,”95 a critic might argue that one is
implicitly questioning if these students are “black enough” or “Asian enough” and
the like. One might conclude that those individuals who only have a biological
component of minority ancestry but otherwise live white lives “seemingly bring
very little to the table in terms of promoting cross-racial understanding and
exchange.”96 Yet, an argument can be made that there is value to the experiences
of those who “grew up White” but later discover their partial ethnic heritage.
Perhaps they might have a new found appreciation for minorities and can speak
from the perspective of someone with a newly found ethnic background.
For another example, consider the conclusion of some scholars that
many Black/White Biracials are less likely than Ascendants to ensure the
unique contributions to the character of education at a selective higher
education program. As a result, some of the benefits of making
classroom discussions more lively, spirited and more enlightening are
lost. Ascendants are also more likely to contribute more to the benefits of
cross-racial understanding that enables students to understand better
persons of different races than many Black/White Biracials.97
Those scholars make an identical conclusion regarding the superior ability of
“Ascendants” or legacy Blacks over those of immigrant Blacks to promote cross
racial understanding and contribute to robust classroom discussions.98 Again, an
argument can be made that Black/White Biracials might have more to offer in
contributing to classroom discussions than monoracial Blacks because they have
exposure to a greater variety of social and cultural experiences, which benefit them
in facilitating cross racial understanding. Likewise, immigrant Blacks might better
foster cross racial understanding than legacy Blacks because they have been
discriminated against by both Whites and legacy Blacks.99
93

Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 76, at 1217–19.
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Id. at 1217.
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Id. at 1219.
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Brown & Bell, supra note 15, at 1264.
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The point is not to debate which is the right conclusion to draw about biracial
Blacks, immigrant Blacks, or applicants who discover their ethnic heritage through
genetic testing, but rather that the conclusions drawn, whatever they may be,
necessarily question deservedness among intraracial groups. Through these
contested inquiries of deservedness, a qualitative diversity approach to school
admissions risks intraracial balkanization.100
The Model Minority label101 ascribed to Asians serves as a current example of
interracial fragmentation102 and is instructive for the potential of intraracial
fragmentation. The phrase Model Minority conveys the image of Asian Americans
as hardworking, intelligent, and focused on achievement, and that through these
attributes, Asian Americans succeed in American society.103 The origins of the
Model Minority myth can be traced to the arrival of the Chinese laborers,
“Coolies,” imported through a slave trade to work at plantations and factories.104 In
an effort to “punish the negro for having abandoned the control of his old master,”
the Chinese laborers were praised for being “more obedient and industrious than
the negro.”105 To attack the Irish, The New York Times contrasted the Chinese
laborers from the Irish immigrants: “‘John Chinaman’ was a better addition to
society than was ‘Paddy’” because the Chinese were not prone to excessive
drinking and violence.106 In the mid-1960s, the phrase “model minority” was
coined, and the image was propelled by an article featured in the New York Times
Sunday Magazine that praised Japanese Americans as “a minority that has risen
above even prejudiced criticism.”107 The article proclaimed that “[b]y any criterion
of good citizenship that we choose, the Japanese Americans are better than any
group in our society, including native-born whites.”108
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For example, “[e]ven among black scholars there is disagreement on whether a
discussion about the origins of black students is helpful. Orlando Patterson, a Harvard
sociologist and West Indian native, said he wished others would ‘let sleeping dogs lie.’”
Rimer & Arenson, supra note 83.
101
For a critique of the Model Minority image, see Wu, supra note 39, at 244–47.
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Lee, supra note 50, at 136 (“[T]he [Model Minority] image serves to divide Asian
Americans from other racial groups, essentially pitting minorities against each other.”). For
other examples of racial tension between Asians and other groups, see Allred, supra note
48, at 74–75.
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Chew, supra note 39, at 24; see also Jean Shin, The Asian American Closet, 11
ASIAN L. J. 1, 3–7 (2004) (discussing the stereotypes that accompany the Model Minority
image).
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Wu, supra note 39, at 230–33 (recounting the arrival and experiences of Chinese
laborers around the Reconstruction era). Chew, supra note 39, at 9 n.15.
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Wu, supra note 39, at 231.
106
Id.
107
Wu, supra note 39, at 237.
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As a result of the Model Minority myth,
Asian Americans are isolated from both sides of the black/white
paradigm. African Americans and Hispanic Americans may resent Asian
Americans for their perceived success. On the other hand, whites are also
not eager to claim Asians as their own. The perpetual foreigner
stereotype109 belies any alliance between Asian Americans and whites, as
does the very term “model minority.” By specifically calling Asian
Americans a minority, it sets them apart as the “other.”110
In his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan candidly noted how perceptions
of Asian Americans as foreigners function to exclude them: “There is a race so
different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become
citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race.”111
Similarly, immigrant Blacks are cast as Model Black Minorities. They are
described as “exceptionally motivated,”112 “with an immense drive to succeed by
traditional standards,”113 and assimilable.114 “[P]ast research has shown that, in the
employment context, immigrant Blacks are identified as the ‘good Blacks’ or the
‘model black minority’ when compared to legacy Blacks.”115 Likewise,
Black/White Biracials are described as “seem[ing] more polite, less hostile, more
solicitous and easier to get along with than Ascendants.”116 The image ascribed to
immigrant Blacks and Black/White Biracials as more favored over legacy Blacks
or Ascendants causes isolation between them. As a result, “biracial black students
were less likely to feel close to other black students and more likely to report
extreme or considerable alienation from black students on campus.”117
Consequently, these model minority myths, conjured by those who view one
racial group as more deserved than another, can cause interracial and intraracial
fragmentation. Because qualitative diversity seeks to measure merit by means of
determining which intraracial group better confers the benefits of diversity, a
qualitative diversity approach is likely to exacerbate the current fragmentation
between and among racial groups.
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See Chew, supra note 39, at 33–38 (describing the perception of foreignness).
Allred, supra note 48, at 72–73.
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3. Is There Room for Asian Americans?
Qualitative diversity, some would argue, has the potential to re-conceptualize
Asians from a monolithic group to a group with varying ethnicities. The cramped
view of Asians as a monolithic racial group has harmed Southeast Asians, such as
Cambodians, Hmong, and Laotians, who are underrepresented.118 “Nearly half of
all Americans of Southeast Asian descent live in poverty,” and a large percentage
are first-generation immigrants who fled their home country as political
refugees.119 While the qualitative diversity approach may hold promise for
Southeast Asians to break away from the monolithic “Asian” group and to garner
more seats in America’s colleges, it would require a concomitant nuanced
conception of diversity that does not mirror the population or applicant pool, as is
the current trend among higher education institutions. Otherwise, under existing
caps for Asians, the increased admissions of Southeast Asians would be perceived
as a “‘negative action’ against highly represented Asian Americans (i.e., Chinese,
Korean, etc.), as the school would be redistributing spots that otherwise would
have gone to those groups of Asian Americans.”120
Whether there is room for more Asians Americans, Blacks, etc. is contingent
upon a school’s conception of diversity and critical mass. If diversity is capped for
each racial group in proportion to the applicant pool or population, the contests
over deservedness will heighten. Thus, whether the debate centers on legacy
Blacks versus immigrant Blacks, or Southeast Asians versus other Asians, the
qualitative diversity approach brings us back full circle to the uncomfortable
discussion of deservedness.
III. RELIANCE ON STEREOTYPES
For qualitative diversity to be realized, admissions officers would need to sift
through thousands of applications while making finer distinctions among
applicants than previously necessitated by the broader diversity rationale. The
qualitative diversity rationale brings greater temptation for these admissions
officers to employ stereotypes as a proxy to facilitate expedient considerations of
the mounds of application files.
Professor Devon Carbado explains how intraracial diversity might be
implemented for higher education admissions and uses three hypothetical black
applicants to illustrate.121 He creates three profiles for an admissions officer to
118
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consider: Kimberly, who is raised by a single mother in the inner city and attends a
high school composed mostly of Blacks; Tanisha, who is raised by a policeman
and a stay-at-home mother and lives in the inner city, but attends school in the
suburbs; and Rachel, with parents who are a dentist and lawyer, who attends an
elite private high school and lives in a white neighborhood.122 Professor Carbado
explores how, depending on the diversity benefit a school seeks to attain, an
admissions officer would prefer a particular profile over another, thereby making
intraracial distinctions.
Whether the admissions officer prefers racially salient African
Americans could turn on the precise diversity benefit she seeks to
advance. If that officer wants black students who will facilitate racial
cooperation and understanding, for example, that preferred diversity
benefit increases the likelihood that the officer will admit Blacks whose
racial identities are not salient. If, on the other hand, an officer wants
black students who will make the environment more racially conscious,
she will likely admit black students whose racial identities are salient.123
The notable problem in any defense of qualitative diversity, as seen in
Professor Carbado’s illustrations, is the reliance on racial stereotypes. For
example, Professor Carbado examines whether Rachel, a black applicant of West
Indian descent, would be an effective debiasing agent to promote the diversity
benefit of breaking down racial stereotypes.124 He concludes that whether Rachel
will more effectively advance the goal of dismantling racial stereotypes will
depend on whether her Caribbean background is salient—whether she outwardly
displays and embraces her Caribbean heritage.125 “This different treatment,” he
explains, “is based on the view that Caribbean blacks are not ‘really’ black or that,
unlike African Americans, they are not ‘negatively’ black. This limits the ability of
people of Caribbean descent to stand in for African Americans” in a way that could
alter other students’ views of African Americans.126
As Professor Carbado ultimately recognizes, “intraracial selections likely
trade on biases and stereotypes.”127 He explains, “Crudely, and with respect to
African Americans, we judge them based not only on whether we think they are
black but also on how stereotypically black, or how race-consciously black, we
perceive them to be.”128
Similarly, to advance her argument for greater inclusion of legacy Blacks at
elite schools, Professor Onwuachi-Willig details the advantages that immigrant
122
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Blacks experience. She posits that “mixed-race students and first- and secondgeneration Blacks may be better positioned to be admitted to and survive elite
college and university environments because of the relative ease (compared to
legacy Blacks) with which they can integrate and assimilate into white circles.”129
The explanation for this, as Professor Onwuachi-Willig suggests, rests on the
integration of immigrant Blacks in white neighborhoods.130 Another commentator
surmises that because immigrant Blacks have a more diverse group of high school
friends, they are “less likely to find interactions across racial lines to be foreign
and alienating on campus.”131 Additionally, Professor Onwuachi-Willig contends
that “acculturation into American society is easier for immigrant Blacks because of
positive images of hard-working immigrants, which stand in contrast to stereotypes
of lazy black Americans.”132 Furthermore, Onwuachi-Willig points out that
“psychological advantages may derive from being a voluntary immigrant as
opposed to an involuntary immigrant, and such advantages include the selfassurances of coming from a majority black country with black leaders and role
models as well as immigrant optimism about future opportunities in the United
States.”133
The possibility of a contrary assumption, however, should be recognized—
that immigrant Blacks might have greater difficulty integrating into white
environments because they previously have been accustomed, more so than legacy
Blacks, to living in a minority dominant country. Another possibility is that
immigrant Blacks likely experience greater difficulty in assimilating with Whites
because they are burdened with navigating through a new economic, social,
political, cultural, and educational system and establishing a new way of life.
Again, the purpose of this discussion is not to declare which conclusions are
correct but to point out that qualitative diversity invites distinctions between
immigrant Blacks and legacy Blacks and other intraracial groups that are laden
with stereotypes and presumptions. The irony is that deciding who can better
confer the benefits of diversity in overcoming racial stereotypes, fostering racial
understanding, and contributing to a robust classroom discussion begets making
racial stereotypes.134
129
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Critics of affirmative action will quickly point out this irony when qualitative
diversity distinctions are made. Or, worse, they may even disparage it as
hypocrisy. A critic might complain that when used negatively, an intraracial
distinction is bluntly condemned as discrimination, but an interesting conceptual
reframing takes place when those who want to increase minority representation
rely on it: it is lauded as promoting intraracial diversity or qualitative diversity. In
sum, the qualitative diversity approach is fraught with contradictions, and thereby
strains the diversity rationale.
IV. THE DILEMMA OF NARROW TAILORING
The battle for affirmative action will be fought over the strict scrutiny test’s
requirements for necessity and narrow tailoring. Previously, I examined in a
different work whether a university’s resort to a race-based policy satisfies the
Court’s demand for showing necessity.135 This part builds upon my prior work by
exploring whether the qualitative diversity rationale complies with narrow
tailoring.
Because racial classifications, benign or invidious, trigger strict scrutiny,
defendants must satisfy two prongs: 1) compelling interest and 2) necessity and
narrow tailoring. “[T]he use of quotas,136 the flexibility of the program,137 the
duration of the relief,138 the scope of the program,139 individualized
considerations,140 and the necessity of the program compared with the efficacy of
race neutral alternatives”141 have been relevant factors in the Court’s determination
of narrowly tailored.142 In evaluating qualitative diversity for narrow tailoring, the
approach will be most susceptible to criticisms that it lacks a logical endpoint143
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because universities will attempt to carry qualitative diversity beyond the macro
level of the student body population to the microcosm of “small classes”; use the
approach to achieve racial balancing; and stretch the meaning of qualitative
diversity to the point of hairsplitting the concept. Moreover, because qualitative
diversity relies on presumptions about how students’ race affects how they act and
think, and how others will react and feel, it is likely to fail narrow tailoring.
A. No Logical Endpoint
1. Student Population versus Classroom Population
UT Austin’s recent deployment of the diversity rationale seeks to extend
diversity to a finer level—from the student body population to the classroom
population. According to the university’s study, in “classes with 10 to 24 students,
[it] found that 89% of those classes had either one or zero African–American
students, 41% had one or zero Asian–American students, and 37% had either one
or zero Hispanic students.”144 One scholar contends that
[t]hese small classes are presumably the classroom settings where racial
stereotypes could be broken down and cross-racial understanding could
be fostered, and unless there are at least two students of any group, there
cannot be diverse perspectives represented from that group. In that sense,
diversity within racial groups was implicit in UT’s concept of critical
mass, although not stated directly.145
The university revised its earlier study that surveyed classes containing
between five and twenty-four students, perhaps because of its realization that it is
numerically impossible for a class with fewer than ten students to contain at least
two students from every racial group (White, Black, Hispanic/Latino, Native
American, and Asian American).146 Even if a significant number of minorities
were admitted, it would still be a statistical challenge to produce a class of ten
students, with exactly two students representing each race. The university’s
constrained conception of diversity in small classes contorts the critical mass
calculus.
Now that the Fisher II Court has embraced the diversity rationale in smaller
classes, it is no stretch of the imagination that higher education institutions will

undefined) for qualitative diversity will be reached.’ UT’s intra-racial diversity rationale is
thus too imprecise to permit strict scrutiny analysis.” (citations omitted)).
144
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push the boundary to advocate for qualitative diversity in those small classes.147
Thus, although a small class might be racially diverse, having the minimum of two
students from each racial group as suggested by one scholar, a university might
likely argue that race-based admissions are still needed to achieve qualitative
diversity in these classes. Again, it would be a statistical feat to enroll at least two
students of each intraracial group in these small classes. Consider the following: 1)
there are 562 tribes or federally recognized Indian Nations in the U.S.;148 2) the
U.S. Census recognizes Asians to include “a person having origins in any of the
original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent,
including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan,
the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam”;149 3) the U.S. Census also applies
“[t]he Black racial category [to] include[] people who marked the ‘Black, African
Am., or Negro’ checkbox. . . . [or] respondents who reported entries such as
African American; Sub-Saharan African entries, such as Kenyan and Nigerian; and
Afro-Caribbean entries, such as Haitian and Jamaican”;150 and 4) the U.S. Census
applies the “Hispanic or Latino” category to include “a person of Cuban, Mexican,
Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin
regardless of race.”151 In light of the innumerable intraracial groups, achieving
intraracial diversity in small classes would require increasing class enrollment to
include more than fifty students, which would obviate the very purpose of a small
class, in order to allow for two students from each ethnicity or intraracial group to
enroll. The university might respond that it would not carry the qualitative
diversity to this extreme, but critics might not be comforted by this assurance.
2. Racial Balancing
Furthermore, critics would point out that a university’s objective to have each
racial group represented in small classes would amount to racial balancing. These
small classes are likely elective classes, which students enroll in to satisfy their
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chosen major, and are driven by a student’s choice.152 Studies show that particular
professions or majors attract more students of a certain racial group—that “race
and ethnicity affects major choice.”153 A study found, for example, that “[f]or
engineering and computer science, slightly smaller shares of black and Hispanic
males choose this field of study compared with white males. In their freshman
year, Asian and other males, including foreign students, are much more likely than
white males to identify a major in engineering and computer science.”154 As I have
pointed out in my earlier work, “designing admissions procedures for the purpose
of reflecting a population’s diversity would violate the Court’s prohibition on
racial balancing.”155 Similarly, using race-based admissions to attain diversity or
qualitative diversity in small classes in proportion to the general population or
student body population would offend the Court’s jurisprudential constraints.156
The Court has found it “‘completely unrealistic’ to expect that ‘minorities will
choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local
population’”157 and unequivocally held that “[r]acial balancing is not to be
achieved for its own sake.”158
3. Hairsplitting Qualitative Diversity
The qualitative diversity approach has no logical endpoint because intraracial
diversity is susceptible to hairsplitting. Who is sufficiently diverse, and to what
degree do we measure diversity? As previously discussed, students who were part
descendants of minority groups but grew up in a white household could not claim
minority status without being accused as frauds.159 In one situation, genetic testing
confirmed that a pair of twins, who grew up with adoptive white parents, were
“nine percent Native American and eleven percent North African.”160 Thus, these
students were one-fifth minority, yet they could not claim minority status without
152
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insinuations of misrepresentation.161 Ironically, these students had a greater
biological claim to minority status than Homer Plessy, who was only one-eighth
Black and lacked any Afro-centric phenotypes.162 Query, if Homer Plessy were
applying for admissions, would we allow him to check the Black box?
The implementation of qualitative diversity requires institutions of higher
education to discern “racial merit,” which at bottom depends on one’s definition of
race. Although the debate over racial box checking is not new within the broader
diversity discussion, qualitative diversity can potentially draw the controversy to a
new height because whether race is a biological or social construct163 is
contested.164
The ready availability of genetic testing has advanced our understanding of
race, but in the process, it raises difficult questions that must be grappled with in
applying qualitative diversity. For instance, researchers at 23andMe, a private
genetic testing company, found that
people who identified as African-American had genes that were only
73.2 percent African. European genes accounted for 24 percent of their
DNA, while .8 percent came from Native Americans. Latinos, on the
other hand, had genes that were on average 65.1 percent European, 18
percent Native American, and 6.2 percent African. The researchers found
that European-Americans had genomes that were on average 98.6
percent European, .19 percent African, and .18 Native American.165
161
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If race is a biological construct, the results of the 23andMe research leads to
questions about how qualitative diversity addresses the genetic melting pot that is
America. Historically, racial classifications were made based on blood quantum.
For example, hypodescent laws ascribed persons with one drop of blood from
black ancestry as Black.166 Although hypodescent laws were used as a vehicle to
discriminate against minorities,167 the blood quantum principle underlying
hypodescent laws can be redeployed as a vehicle for inclusion. A reliance on
genetic results would be consistent with the biological approach to racial
classification and would entitle people, such as the adoptive twins mentioned
above, to check the minority box(es).
On the other hand, if race is a social construct, then Rachel Dolezal, the
former President of the Spokane chapter of the NAACP, can legitimately claim she
is Black. Yet, Rachel Dolezal has been vilified as a fraud because she is
biologically white but claimed to be black on an application.168 Dolezal grew up
with four adoptive Black siblings; attended Howard University, an HBCU; became
an activist for African Americans through her work with the NAACP; and assumed
a black appearance.169 That Dolezal identifies as Black is unquestionable.170
Ironically, Professor Onwuachi-Willig’s definition of race as “a social construct,
which makes one’s race just as much about how others perceive him or her as it
does about how one identifies or perceives oneself,”171 should permit Dolezal to
check the box for Black on her application, but would prevent the adoptive twins
discussed above from doing so because they “share none of the social and
psychological experiences of being a racial minority.”172
Moreover, biracial or multiracial students prompt questions of which racial
category may students claim. Should President Barrack Obama, who is half-White
and half-Black, was raised by his white mother and abandoned by his black father,
and is a second generation immigrant be permitted to identify as Black on an
application?173 Consider Tiger Woods, whose mother is “half-Thai, one-quarter
166
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Chinese and one-quarter white” and whose father is “half-black, one-quarter
American Indian, and one-quarter Chinese.”174 Although Tiger Woods publicly
refused to be labeled singularly as African American and coined his own identity
as “Cablinasian” to reflect his Caucasian, Black, Native American, and Asian
heritage, may he check the Black box on a college application and receive racial
preference for college admission?175 Or because he descends from a greater
combined percentage of Asian ancestry, must Tiger Woods check the Asian box
and suffer the admissions cap that some elite universities apply to Asian
Americans?
B. The Guessing Game
Qualitative diversity is based on fuzzy notions of what viewpoints or
contributions certain subpopulations of a particular race can make and, ultimately,
is nothing more than mere guesswork at what an applicant may think or feel. In
formulating a potential defense for UT Austin, Professor Carbado offers that “UT
could . . . . argue that students who grow up in racially segregated neighborhoods
and attend racially segregated schools might not be the best diversity candidates to
facilitate racial cooperation and understanding because they will have had little or
no exposure to whites or other nonblacks.”176 He admits that the school may be
mistaken, but nonetheless its decision would comport with “good faith.”177
Qualitative diversity is fraught with presumptions about how people act,
think, believe, and want. Whether presumptions are sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional mandate of “good faith” is questionable. Even more tenuous is
whether admission decisions founded on such presumptions are narrowly tailored.
First, it is important to clear up any ambiguity about the meaning of good
faith. One must ascertain whether good faith pertains to the compelling interest
prong or the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny. The Grutter Court made two
distinct conclusions concerning good faith that can be interpreted to require good
faith for both prongs. The first conclusion stated,
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[T]hat the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at
the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good
faith” on the part of a university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the
contrary.”178
The second conclusion stated, “Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious,
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the
diversity the university seeks.”179 The first statement concerning good faith
pertains to the compelling interest prong—that the Court will presume good faith
in a school’s determination that diversity is necessary for its mission—and is
distinct from the second statement, which is focused on the narrow tailoring prong.
Perhaps under previous interpretations of Grutter, presumptions about what
students think, feel, and want with regards to their classmates might go
unquestioned because some courts erroneously interpreted Grutter as conferring
substantial deference to schools for both prongs of strict scrutiny, namely as to
whether diversity is central to their mission and the means chosen to achieve
diversity. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Fisher
held that to “second-guess the merits” of this aspect of the University’s
decision was a task it was “ill-equipped to perform” and that it would
attempt only to “ensure that [the University’s] decision to adopt a raceconscious admissions policy followed from [a process of] good faith
consideration.” The Court of Appeals thus concluded that “the narrowtailoring inquiry—like the compelling-interest inquiry—is undertaken
with a degree of deference to the Universit[y].”180
The deference conferred to schools in evaluating narrow tailoring has been
the subject of much scholarly criticism, and ultimately, the Supreme Court in
Fisher I clarified that Grutter intended for courts to evaluate the narrow tailoring
prong without ceding deference to schools: “Strict scrutiny does not permit a court
to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible
way without a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process works
in practice.”181
Under Fisher’s stringent adherence to narrow tailoring, a school’s use of race
to attain qualitative diversity might appear specious when presumptions are made
about students’ racial mentality and behavior. The Court has rejected treating
178
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people differently based on presumptions about how their racial background might
affect their actions and thoughts. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission,182 Justice O’Connor’s dissent maintained that
“[s]ocial scientists may debate how peoples’ thoughts and behavior reflect their
background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate
benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or
ethnicity determines how they act or think.”183
V. RETHINKING DIVERSITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Scholarly works are replete with critiques of affirmative action, and they need
not be repeated here. Rather, in this Part, this Article highlights a few possible
challenges that critics might lodge against affirmative action as they specifically
relate to the qualitative diversity rationale. The concerns analyzed in this part serve
to alert advocates to the danger that a push to advance the qualitative diversity
rationale might invite the Court to reexamine whether diversity is a compelling
purpose. Although Fisher did not challenge diversity as a compelling interest,184
the Court is primed to reconsider it in future litigation.185
A. Elusive Justifications for Affirmative Action
The first concern is that a qualitative diversity approach propounds the
problems that inhere in the broader diversity rationale. Scholars, even those who
support affirmative action, have questioned the efficacy of the diversity rationale
as a vehicle for promoting affirmative action.186
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497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
183
Id. at 602 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Metro found
vindication in her later authored majority opinion in Adarand. Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
184
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (“There is disagreement about whether Grutter was
consistent with the principles of equal protection in approving this compelling interest in
diversity. But the parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter’s
holding.” (citations omitted)).
185
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
186
For example, Professor Samuel Issacharoff has pondered the deployment of the
diversity rationale and pointed out its limits on fully realizing diversity:
[I]f diversity of the learning environment is the real objective behind affirmative
action, one must wonder why preferential admission is limited to groups that are
defined to some extent by histories of being subject to official discrimination.
As the philosopher George Sher asks,
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Professor Derrick Bell identified four concerns with the diversity rationale:
1) Diversity enables courts and policymakers to avoid addressing directly
the barriers of race and class that adversely affect so many applicants; 2)
Diversity invites further litigation by offering a distinction without a real
difference between those uses of race approved in college admissions
programs, and those in other far more important affirmative action
policies that the Court has rejected; 3) Diversity serves to give
undeserved legitimacy to the heavy reliance on grades and test scores
that privilege well-to-do, mainly white applicants; and 4) The
tremendous attention directed at diversity programs diverts concern and
resources from the serious barriers of poverty that exclude far more
students from entering college than are likely to gain admission under an
affirmative action program.187
Professor Richard Ford criticized the diversity rationale for “essentializ[ing]
minorities by ascribing certain characteristics to them and requiring racial
minorities to ‘perform’ stereotyped versions of their identities in order to justify
their presence within institutions.”188
Additionally, some researchers question whether diversity truly enhances a
student’s educational experience.189 Two studies are worth examining.190 These
For even if diversity yields every one of the intellectual benefits that are claimed
for it, why should we benefit most when the scholarly community contains
substantial numbers of blacks, women, Hispanics, (American) Indians, Aleuts,
and Chinese-Americans? Why not focus instead, or in addition, on Americans of
Eastern European, Arabic, or (Asian) Indian extraction? For that matter, can’t
we achieve even greater benefit by extending preference to native Africans,
Asians, Arabs, and Europeans?
Samuel Issacharoff, Law and Misdirection in the Debate over Affirmative Action, 2002 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 11, 22 (2002); see also Brandon Paradise, Racially Transcendent Diversity,
50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 415, 422 (2012) (“To remedy the diversity rationale’s failure to
ensure racial diversity some scholars have continued to argue that the Court’s amorphous
concept of diversity should be replaced with a substantive understanding of diversity that
acknowledges the special significance of racial diversity over diversity factors with less
normative importance . . . .”); Yin, supra note 3, at 95–96 (“[N]ot all affirmative action
defenders fully support the diversity theory, and some others openly admit that they
promote diversity primarily because it is the justification that the Supreme Court has
permitted for affirmative action programs.”).
187
Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003).
188
Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2168 (2013) (quoting
RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE 59–64 (2005)).
189
See, e.g., Charles A. O’Reilly III et al., Work Group Demography, Social
Integration, and Turnover, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 21, 29–30 (1989) (concluding that
homogeneity increases social integration and reduces turnover); Leong, supra note 188, at
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studies concluded that those “who attended historically Black universities reported
better academic performance, greater social involvement, and higher occupational
aspirations than Black students who attended predominantly White institutions.”191
Because of their small sample size, the studies’ statistical significance should not
be overstated. But if these studies can be further validated, they suggest that
African Americans, and maybe all minorities, are better off in minority-majority
schools192 and give us pause to question who really benefits from diversity or
qualitative diversity.
B. Diversity as a Means to an End for Whites
The qualitative diversity approach, much like the general diversity rationale,
utilizes individuals, particularly minorities, for the actualization of benefits that
accrue to the class and institution. In this way, the qualitative diversity approach is
prone to the criticism that the presence of minorities for cross racial understanding
and overcoming racial stereotypes benefits Whites,193 and substantiates Professor
Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory that nonwhites only progress when it
benefits Whites.194
In the same vein as Professor Bell’s theory, Professor Nancy Leong develops
a theory of racial capitalism that highlights the commodification of nonwhites for
social utility.195 She identifies the harms to nonwhites resulting from racial
capitalism to include “fractur[ing] identity, creat[ing] pressure for nonwhite people
2166. For an excellent analysis of the social science data on the benefits of diversity, see
Justin Pidot, Note, Intuition or Proof: The Social Science Justification for the Diversity
Rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, 59 STAN. L. REV. 761 (2006).
Pidot concludes that “[d]espite all of these data, no clear picture emerges. Virtually all of
the studies have some degree of methodological flaw, and, at best, correlations exist
between certain types of experiences (which may or may not be correlated with numeric
diversity) and certain positive outcomes. Even these correlations, however, explain little of
the variance in outcomes.” Id. at 794. Contra Charles E. Daye et al., Does Race Matter in
Educational Diversity? A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 75,
76 (2012) (concluding that diversity improves educational quality).
190
See Pidot, supra note 189, at 794 (evaluating studies about the educational benefits
of diversity).
191
See id.
192
I am cognizant that this question might invoke criticisms of paternalism. I am
mindful of Professor Kermit Roosevelt III’s insightful commentary regarding Justice
Thomas’s reference to the mismatch theory: “Their claim, remember, is that attending an
elite school will ultimately prove harmful to minority students . . . and that, therefore, this
option should be taken away from them. That is paternalism, plain and simple.” Kermit
Roosevelt III, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 729, 750 (2015).
193
Leong, supra note 188, at 2171.
194
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
195
Leong, supra note 188, at 2152.
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to engage in particular identity performances, and inflict[ing] economic harm by
placing nonwhite people at the greater mercy of the market.”196 By connecting
racial identity formation’s importance to self-esteem, she posits that racial
capitalism “dissociates racial identity from the individual.”197 Additionally, racial
capitalism forces nonwhites to perform in a way that alters their identity.198 As an
example, nonwhite individuals may be encouraged to emphasize their
nonwhiteness to enhance their consideration for admissions under the diversity
rationale,199 or to distance themselves from their nonwhiteness to form a more
favorable version of themselves.200 Additionally, she identifies the societal harms
wreaked by racial capitalism, which approximate those identified by Professor Bell
in his critique of diversity’s distractions.201 The societal harms include
“impoverish[ing] our discourse around race, foster[ing] racial resentment, and
ultimately displac[ing] more meaningful antiracism measures.”202
Qualitative diversity relies on racial capitalism in that an individual’s worth is
measured by the individual’s contribution to the school and class. In doing so,
qualitative diversity can create the types of societal and individual harms that
Professor Leong described. For example, to appeal to admissions officers,
nonwhite individuals might engage in identity performance to a greater degree
under the qualitative diversity approach because they must now emphasize their
nonwhiteness to distinguish themselves from other intraracial individuals, i.e., they
are “more black” than the other Black applicants. Or conversely, they might
conceal or minimize their nonwhiteness to separate themselves from other
nonwhites in their racial group, i.e., they are “not as black” as the other Black
applicants. The harm to identity formation is greater under the pursuit for
qualitative diversity because the nonwhite must reconcile not only her
disassociation of her identity from her true self, but also her disassociation of her
racial group. As applicants employ strategies to cloak their intraracial identity, they
confine themselves to a “closet [that] can become an ‘identity prison.’”203 As for
the societal harms, qualitative diversity requires a more nuanced examination into
the diversity benefits each intraracial applicant can provide, and by burying our
noses in the minutiae of intraracial qualities, we become more divorced from the
structural barriers that created the original inequities that affirmative action was
intended to remedy.
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Id. at 2208. For additional in-depth discussion about the strategy of “covering” as
a coping mechanism and means to assimilate, see Shin, supra note 103, at 1–2 (exploring
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See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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C. Pandering to the Majority
As minorities become consumed with distinguishing themselves from their
intraracial cohorts, they fall prey to pandering to the majoritarian conception of
qualitative diversity. In his thoughtful work on intraracial diversity, Professor
Carbado provides suggestions on how a university can implement qualitative
diversity to realize the benefits of diversity. For example, he elaborates on how the
UT Austin could have asserted the goal of stereotype negation to defend its pursuit
of qualitative diversity:
The university could believe that white students will perceive the black
students who are admitted under the Ten Percent Law as racially
salient—that is, as students who attended the black schools and/or lived
in the black neighborhoods. More colorfully, white students could
perceive these students as “really” black and attribute a range of negative
racial stereotypes to them. Alternatively, the university might believe
that white students will experience these African American admittees as
overly racially conscious and thus racially uncomfortable to be around.
None of the foregoing dynamics are helpful in terms of negating negative
racial stereotypes. Indeed, all of them, in one way or another, activate
racial stereotypes.204
Aside from the fact that the above suggestions rely on a double dose of racial
stereotypes—what black students from the Top Ten Percent Plan can contribute
and what white students think of these students—they raise another objection that
critics might launch: pandering to the majority. The above example suggests that
white students’ discomfort around students perceived as “really” black can guide
an admission officer’s decision to prefer and admit a black student who is “less”
black, thereby giving credence to the “discomfort” felt by whites in the name of
“negating negative racial stereotypes.”205 Such acquiescence to the discomfort of
whites implicates discrimination concerns, contradicting the original purpose of
dismantling racial stereotypes and the Court’s jurisprudence.
The Court has consistently denounced acquiescence to a heckler’s veto as a
sufficient constitutional basis for discrimination. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.,206 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a city council’s
refusal to grant a special use permit for a facility intended for the mentally
retarded.207 One basis for the council’s refusal was premised on its concern about
“the negative attitude of the majority of property owners” and “fears of elderly”
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neighbors.208 The Court rebuked the city’s assent to those fears: “But mere
negative attitudes, or fear, . . . are not permissible bases for treating a home for the
mentally retarded differently . . . . It is plain that . . . the City may not avoid the
strictures of [the Equal Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections
of some fraction of the body politic.”209
Similarly, in Palmore v. Sidoti,210 the Supreme Court invalidated the removal
of a child from a white mother’s custody simply because she remarried a black
man.211 The state court had divested the mother’s custody due to fear of the social
stigma that the child might face growing up with a black stepparent.212 The
Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices
but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”213
Finally, qualitative diversity decisions that tinker with the racial makeup of an
entering class or small classroom based on the sensitivities of whites or other racial
groups bear a strong resemblance to allowing customers to influence an
employer’s hiring decision based on race. In the employment context, it is
abundantly clear, as a constitutional matter as well as statutory, that employment
practices cannot be driven by the consumer’s racial preference. “Race and color—
the other two grounds of discrimination that are made unlawful by Title VII—are
omitted, and certainly not by an oversight. . . . Title VII is a blanket prohibition of
racial discrimination, rational and irrational alike, even more so than of other forms
of discrimination attacked in Title VII.”214 Just as employment decisions cannot be
substantiated on customers’ racial preferences, neither can admissions decisions—
even for intraracial distinctions.
D. Gaming the System
By subjecting themselves to guessing about the majoritarian preferences of an
institution, minority students make themselves vulnerable to gaming the system.
The Court has been keen to note the “perverse incentives” created by the class rank
system, which encourages students to stay in lower performing schools.215 Yet, it
failed to recognize the “perverse incentives” presented by the qualitative diversity
approach. Qualitative diversity invites students to game the system by minimizing
or maximizing intraracial attributes in order to take advantage of racial
preferences.
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Professor Carbado provides examples of how Blacks can work their identity to
become attractive in a qualitative diversity sense: “I illustrate the subtle but
significant ways in which applicants can ‘blacken’ or ‘whiten’ their applications in
relation to their sense of the specific racial types an institution might want to
admit.”216 He offers the following example:
A student of Trinidadian descent, for example, might highlight that
background in the hope that an admissions official will assume that he is
a “good” black—a black who is likely to fit into a predominantly white
school and not trigger stereotypes about blackness. Alternatively, that
very same student might worry that highlighting his Trinidadian
background could render him less authentically black from the
perspective of an admissions official and thus not a good candidate for
advancing that school’s preferred diversity benefit. He may choose
instead, then, to emphasize the fact that he lives in Inglewood, a
predominantly working class African American neighborhood south of
the city of Los Angeles. In short, whether a black applicant plays up the
Caribbean background or his upbringing in Inglewood, there is an
incentive for him to cloak himself in the characteristics that he thinks
best mimic the diversity goals he believes an admissions committee
wants to instantiate.217
As previously discussed, encouraging students to work their identities in pursuit of
qualitative diversity points causes individual and societal harms through racial
capitalism.
Additionally, it must be recognized that all players may begin to game the
system. When Whites engage in working their identity, it would be unfair to cry
foul. For example, when students who discover their multiethnicity through
genetic testing decide to identify as a minority for admissions purposes, they are
criticized for taking advantage of the system and chastised as dishonest.218 We
must be prepared for the prospect that qualitative diversity opens the door to
greater racial identity construction by all involved and greater manipulation of the
admissions process. Lowell High School serves as a lesson on how affirmative
action, initiated for corrective justice, evolved into “affirmative action for
whites.”219 Similarly, affirmative action advocates must be cautious about the
potential for the qualitative diversity approach to be appropriated as a mechanism
for advancing Whites.
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CONCLUSION
Much energy has been exerted and ink spilled over debating the merits of the
diversity rationale and affirmative action. A qualitative diversity approach is likely
to lead us deeper into the morass. It invites questions of deservedness;
presumptions about how a person’s race affects the way others act, think, and feel;
applicants to manipulate their intraracial attributes in order to game the system;
and balkanization of intraracial groups. The qualitative diversity approach subjects
applicants to work their identity to appeal to a majoritarian construction of
diversity and results in greater harm to the individual and society. In the end, the
qualitative diversity approach, which was intended to bring us together through
robust discussions, gains in cross racial understanding, and dismantling racial
stereotypes, threatens to propel us further apart.

